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This paper identiﬁes the sources of divergences between current exchange rate poli-
cies in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). We use an ordered logit
model for the oﬃcial (de jure) and the actual (de facto)e x c h a n g er a t ec l a s s i ﬁcations.
We ﬁnd that the diﬀerences of the exchange rate strategies among CEECs cannot be
explained by these classiﬁcations. Financial and trade openness are the major determi-
nants of divergences among exchange rate strategies in CEECs. More ﬁnancially and
trade integrated countries switch to more rigid regimes.
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11 Introduction
The recent enlargement of the European Union (EU), and the ensuing possibility of extension
of the euro area brought the issue of the appropriateness of the exchange rate regime for the
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) to center stage. The CEECs are small
a n do p e ne c o n o m i e sa n dt h e i rt r a d ei sc o n c e n t r a t e dw i t hE u r o p e a nU n i o nm e m b e r s .I nt h e
view of the Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) theory (Mundell 1961, McKinnon 1963), these
countries should peg their currencies to the euro. However, only Lithuania, Estonia and
Bulgaria opted for a tight peg vis-à-vis the euro. Latvia pegged its currency to the Special
Drawing Rights (SDR), while Hungary opted for an intermediate regime and Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania use ﬂoating regimes. Moreover, recently,
in 1997, 1998 and 2000, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, respectively, switched
to more ﬂexible regimes. One of the reasons of these ”controversial” exchange rate regime
choices might be the inadequate evaluation of the eﬀective exchange rate policies in these
countries.
Alternatively, CEECs’ exchange rate regime choices might have been inﬂuenced by other
criteria than the traditional macroeconomic characteristics. In particular, during the last
ten years, these countries experienced major evolutions in economic as well as political
terms. The ﬁrst phase of the transition process towards the market economy included the
liberalization of prices and trade. In the second half of the 1990s, the CEECs made large
progress in disinﬂation, robust economic growth returned and free movement of capital has
been authorized. As a result, these countries started to attract foreign capital and some of
them (Czech Republic in 1997 and Slovakia in 1998) experienced speculative attacks against
their currencies. In addition, these economic developments have been accompanied by po-
litical turmoil and important social pressures. The modern literature on the choice of the
exchange rate regime provides the additional criteria which might explain more adequately
the exchange rate strategies in CEECs.
A major element of the Mundell-Fleming framework is the assumption of perfect capital
mobility. From this model it follows that monetary policies in ﬁnancially open economies
cannot be aimed both at maintaining stable exchange rates and smoothing cyclical output.
Increasing ﬁnancial globalization and more frequent currency crises, resulted in the review of
the dilemma between independent monetary policy and ﬁxed exchange rates (Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ 1995, Eichengreen 1994). Another strand of modern literature has emphasized the
role of political conditions in the selection of exchange rate strategies (Edwards 1996, Tor-
nell and Velasco 1995, Cukierman et al. 1992). Finally, the issue of exchange rate regime
choice has been analysed with a view to its economic consequences and policy require-
2ments to maintain a particular regime (Edison and Melvin, 1990; Gosh et al., 1997). These
new approaches have been used in the literature to determine the choice of the exchange
rate regime. Some authors applied them to large samples of countries (Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger 2002, Edwards 1996, Poirson 2001). Others limited their analysis to emerging
economies (Collins 1996, and Calvo and Mishkin 2003). However, few economists empiri-
cally analysed the exchange rate regime choice problem in CEECs. Corker et al. (2000),
Backé (1999) and Nerlich (2002) examine the exchange rate regime selection in some of the
transition economies using a descriptive study. Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil (1998)
and Boone and Maurel (1999) approach the question of regime selection in CEECs empiri-
cally, but only via OCA theory characteristics. Finally, this problem has been examined by
Von Hagen and Zhou (2002). They develop an empirical model of the choice of the exchange
rate regime for a group of 25 transition economies in the 1990s. Their model tests for the
relevance of OCA variables, ﬁnancial development measures and crises variables to the se-
lection of the exchange rate regime. Moreover, the authors assess the discrepancies between
the de jure and de facto regimes in transition economies. However, they do not account for
political conditions, which seem to be an important factor in the CEECs’ selection of an
exchange rate system.
In order to investigate the main determinants of exchange rate regimes in CEECs, and
the sources of diﬀerences between adopted strategies, we test for two issues. First, we employ
modern and traditional approaches mentioned above, and compare their capacity to explain
the choice of regimes among CEECs. Second, we consider the choice of exchange rate regime
a c c o r d i n gt ot h eo ﬃcial (de jure)a n dde facto classiﬁcations. The discrepancies between
them can indeed be the reason for misleading diﬀerences between exchange rate regimes in
CEECs. We use both of these classiﬁcations, in a way that, to our knowledge, has not been
developed in the existing empirical literature. We include the category of hard peg in order
to test explicitly for the "corner solutions" hypothesis. We embody our hypotheses in an
ordered logit model for an unbalanced panel of ten countries.
The sample includes eight new members of EU i.e. the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. In addition, we supplement this
group by Bulgaria and Romania, in order to diversify our sample. In fact, these two
economies made less progress in transition to the market economy and stabilization of their
economies than the eight new EU members. Our study is based on the period between
1993 and 2002. The reason for choosing 1993 as a start date is due to the unavailability
of the data. In contrast with other work, our empirical study takes into consideration the
most recent evolutions of exchange rate strategies in CEEC, stimulated by the perspective
of joining the euro area.
3The second Section describes the evolution of exchange rate strategies in CEECs and
the discrepancies of de facto and de jure classiﬁcations in these countries. Section 3 reviews
the theoretical hypotheses of diﬀerent approaches to the exchange rate regime choice. In
Section 4, we develop the baseline econometric model of exchange rate regime choice. The
results of our estimations are presented in Section 5, and ﬁnally Section 6 concludes.
2 Regimes in Central and Eastern European countries
2.1 Evolution of exchange rate regimes in CEEC
The CEECs adopted rather diverse exchange rate regimes and monetary strategies since the
early 1990s. Their monetary and exchange rate strategies can be divided into three phases
following the challenges they were confronted with.
During the ﬁrst phase, between 1990 and 1994, the monetary authorities focused on sta-
bilizing the economy. Most CEECs entered the transition process with a monetary overhang
and experienced high inﬂation rates. In order to combat inﬂation, several countries opted for
the external anchor in the form of pegged exchange rates. Few countries (Bulgaria and Ro-
mania) initially adopted ﬂexible exchange rate regimes, despite being confronted with high
inﬂation rates. This might be due to the relatively low level of reserves that these countries
held in the beginning of 1990s.1 This lack of international reserves made it diﬃcult to back
ap e g .
Until the mid-1990s, most CEECs made strong progress in disinﬂation. The need to
stabilize the economy by an external anchor became less necessary and several countries
gradually opted for a more ﬂexible exchange rate regime. The general progress in stabi-
lization of the economy, including the return of economic growth, substantial disinﬂation
accompanied by early liberalization of capital accounts, attracted large capital inﬂows. In
some countries, i.e. those characterized by ﬁxed exchange rates (the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary and Poland), these capital inﬂows required large-scale and costly interventions. As a
consequence, some countries switched towards more ﬂexible regimes. Not all the CEECs,
however, followed more ﬂexible exchange rate strategies. Some countries (the Baltic coun-
tries) maintained the ﬁxed exchange rate regimes they had initially chosen. Finally, Bulgaria
was the main exception, as it switched in the opposite direction, abandoning a relatively
ﬂexible regime and adopting a currency board arrangement.
Several recent changes in exchange rate policies are due to the prospects of joining
the European Monetary Union (EMU). Accordingly, a number of CEECs have already
adjusted their regimes in line with the institutional requirements of future participation in
1During 1992 and 1993, Bulgaria and Romania held, on average, only one ﬁfth of the reserves that
Poland or Hungary possessed during the same period.
4the monetary union. Lithuania recently changed the benchmark of its peg from the US dollar
to the European currency. Hungary introduced a regime which shadows the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) II, i.e. with a central parity vis-à-vis the euro and +/- 15% ﬂuctuation
band. Latvia, pegging to the SDR, has to adapt its regime to the conditions necessary to
join the ERM II system. However, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania still use
a ﬂoating regime. Moreover, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, recently switched to
more ﬂexible regimes.
2.2 Classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes in CEEC
In order to study the choice of the exchange rate regime, it is necessary to employ the proper
classiﬁcation of exchange rate systems. Recently, numerous empirical studies have provided
evidence that the evaluation of adjustments in central parities and foreign exchange market
interventions can generate exchange rate regimes considerably diﬀerent from the oﬃcial
arrangements.2 First, a country might experience very small exchange rate movements,
even though the monetary authorities have no oﬃcial commitment to maintaining the parity.
This behavior is often referred to as the ”fear of ﬂoating” phenomenon. Second, a country
can manifest a ”fear of pegging” behavior. This is the case when a country, claiming to have
a pegged exchange rate, in fact carries out frequent changes in parity.
The approach taken here is, ﬁrst, to report results according to the oﬃcial classiﬁcation,
which uses the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
In addition, we supplement these results by the de facto classiﬁcation, based on the measure
created by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2002). Both classiﬁcations have their shortcomings. The de
jure classiﬁcation reveals the formal commitment of a central bank but it does not capture
the policies inconsistent with this commitment. Although the de facto classiﬁcation has
the advantage of being based on observed behavior, it fails to reﬂect the commitment of
the monetary authorities. In empirical work, the exchange rate regimes (both de facto and
de jure) have been, as a rule, classiﬁed into three categories: peg, intermediate and ﬂoat
regime. We propose here a new categorization inspired by the ” bipolar view” literature. The
proponents of this approach emphasize an increasing role of the hard pegs as a sustainable
solution in emerging economies. Thus, we distinguish in our study the soft pegs from
hard pegs. The de jure exchange rate regimes are classiﬁed into four principal categories:
hard peg, soft peg, intermediate and ﬂoat regime. The hard pegs include currency boards.
The soft pegs contain single currency pegs, SDR pegs and other narrow bands not being
constrained by the strong commitment of the central bank. The intermediate category
2For a detailed disscussion on the discrepency between de facto and de jure exchange rate regime
classiﬁcations, see Calvo and Reinhard (2000), Gosh et al. (1997) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999).
5contains tightly managed and broad band exchange rate systems. Finally, the ﬂoat category
includes managed ﬂoats and free ﬂoats. The de facto regimes are also classiﬁed into four
groups. We regroup the Reinhart and Rogoﬀ categories into four groups.
In Table 1 we show the discrepancies of the de jure and the de facto regimes in CEECs.
Table 1 reports the percentage of adopted regimes, on average in CEEC. The period under
study is divided into three stages: the stabilization phase (1993-1994), the transition phase
(1995-1999) and the preparation phase (2000-2002). This division enables us to observe the
evolution of the exchange rate regimes in these countries.
Table 1: Discrepancies between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes in CEECs
de jure
hard peg soft peg intermediate ﬂoat
Stabilization phase 1993-1994 17% 27% 40% 17%
Transition phase 1995-1999 28% 28% 20% 25%
Preparation phase 2000-2002 30% 30% 10% 30%
1993-2002 25% 28% 23% 24%
de facto
hard peg soft peg intermediate ﬂoat
Stabilization phase 1993-1994 15% 25% 50% 10%
Transition phase 1995-1999 28% 24% 22% 28%
Preparation phase 2000-2002 30% 30% 10% 30%
1993-2002 24% 26% 27% 23%
First of all, we note that the there are no substantial diﬀerences between the evolution
of the de jure and the de facto regimes. During the stabilization phase, the hard and
the soft pegs represented almost the same share of the de jure and the de facto exchange
rate regimes. The ﬂoating regimes were more frequent in the de jure case indicating the
”fear of ﬂoating” behavior. As can be seen in Table 1, 17 percent of CEECs were oﬃcially
ﬂoating, while only 10 percent were carrying out purely ﬂexible strategies in practice. Some
of the oﬃcial ﬂoaters were intervening on the exchange rate markets and thus using the
intermediate regimes. Hence, the latter were more frequent in reality than oﬃcially, which
is conﬁrmed by the 10 percent diﬀerence between the de facto and the de jure intermediate
regimes.
During the transition phase, several countries switched to more ﬂexible regimes. The
share of the ﬂoaters, between 1995 and 1999, represented 25 percent of the de jure arrange-
ments and 28 of the de facto regimes. This change of the exchange rate strategies was
consistent with the progressive opening of CEECs’ capital accounts and increasing risk of
speculative attacks. The number of intermediate regimes declined during this period. The
number of soft pegs, however, remained stable.
6During the last, preparatory phase, the de facto and the de jure regimes clearly con-
verged. While during the previous phases we observe the diﬀerences between the de jure
and the de facto regimes, their shares equalized during the preparation phase. Between 2000
and 2002, we observe a further decline in intermediate regimes. The countries which moved
to more ﬂexible regimes at the end of the transition phase (Poland, the Czech Republic)
kept the ﬂexibility of their exchange rates. The number of countries using pegs in practice
increased, in anticipation of joining the euro area.3
Turning to the overall observations, it seems that there are few discrepancies between the
de jure and the de facto exchange rate regimes in CEECs. First of all, we account for the
hard pegs, which reﬂect the oﬃcial commitment of the central bank as well as the eﬀective
strategies of monetary authorities. Therefore, this exchange rate regime is appropriately
c a t e g o r i z e di nb o t hc l a s s i ﬁcations. Second, the discrepancies were present at the beginning
of the period under consideration, when CEECs manifested ”fear of ﬂo a t i n g”b e h a v i o r .
During the years following the stabilization phase, the de jure and the de facto exchange
rate regimes converged progressively. Finally, the preparation phase clearly shows that the
monetary authorities carry out the policies consistent with their oﬃcial announcements.
The ”fear of ﬂoating” phenomenon disappeared. This phenomenon is due to the lack of
credibility of central banks. Therefore, the perfect convergence of the de jure and the de
facto exchange rate regimes reﬂects an important progress in building the credible monetary
authorities in CEECs.
3 Theoretical Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes
Our analysis of the determinants of exchange rate regimes in CEECs is centered around
four main approaches. The traditional approach is embodied in the theory of Optimum
Currency Areas (OCA). The modern discussions on the choice of exchange rate regime
include the impossible trinity view, the political economy view and the currency crises
approach. These traditional and modern models imply a set of potential determinants of
exchange rate regimes. We include nine of them as explanatory variables in the speciﬁcation.
3.1 OCA Theory
The early literature, based on the theory of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) by Mundell
(1961), stressed the geographical and trade characteristics. This approach weighs the trade
and welfare gains from a stable exchange rate against the beneﬁts of exchange rate ﬂexibility
as a shock absorber in the presence of nominal rigidities. Since stable exchange rates increase
3It is important to note that moving to rigid regimes in CEECs does not reﬂect the corner solutions
hypothesis. In fact, the tight exchange rate policies are not embodied by any commitment of the central
bank (condition claimed by the proponents of the bipolar view).
7trade gains, pegs are more suitable for countries characterized by high trade openness. A
rigid regime is also preferred in small economies, as small countries tend to trade more
internationally. Finally, the geographical concentration of a country’s trade favors pegging
the currency to its main trading partner.
In order to test the relevance of the traditional OCA hypothesis in CEECs, we use
measures of the country’s size (GDP as real GDP), and openness (OPENNESS as the GDP
share of exports plus imports).4
3.2 Impossible Trinity
A key ingredient of the Mundell-Fleming framework is the assumption of perfect capital
mobility. This implies international arbitrage across countries in the form of uncovered
interest parity. From this model it follows that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve
the three goals: exchange rate stabilization, capital market integration and independent
monetary policy. This is usually referred to as ”impossible trinity”. The currency crises in
Mexico, Asia, Brazil and Russia, and increasing capital mobility brought the ”impossible
trinity” hypothesis to the forefront and resulted in the ”bipolar view” of exchange rate
regimes. According to this approach, high capital mobility made intermediate regimes less
viable in ﬁnancially open economies5,6. Since monetary policy in ﬁnancially open economies
cannot be aimed simultaneously at maintaining a stable exchange rate and at smoothing
cyclical output ﬂuctuations, these countries should move to the corner solutions, i.e. pure
ﬂoat or hard peg.
In addition, the rapid process of ﬁnancial deepening and innovation reduced the eﬀec-
tiveness of capital controls. Consequently, the traditional trinity dilemma has been reduced
to the monetary policy-exchange rate stability trade-oﬀ. Moreover, countries with relatively
undeveloped ﬁnancial sectors lack market instruments to conduct domestic open market
operations. Thus, low ﬁnancial development should increase the probability of adopting
pegs.
We assess the empirical relevance of the impossible trinity approach employing as the
explanatory variables a capital control index (RESTR) and the ratio of broad money to
GDP (MONEY, a measure of ﬁnancial development), both lagged one period.
3.3 Currency crisis
The early literature of balance-of-payments crises (Krugman 1979) stressed that crises were
caused by weak ”economic fundamentals”, such as excessive expansionary ﬁscal and mone-
4We use lagged values of these variables in order to minimize potential endogeneity problems.
5Intermediate regimes are all regimes except for the pure ﬂoats and the hard pegs.
6See e.g. Fischer (2001).
8tary policies. It shows that, under a ﬁxed exchange rate, domestic credit expansion in excess
of money demand growth leads to a gradual but persistent loss of international reserves and,
ultimately, to a speculative attack on the currency. The process ends with an attack be-
cause economic agents understand that the ﬁxed exchange rate regime will collapse, as it is
inconsistent with current economic conditions. The empirical implication of this model is
that expansionary monetary policy combined with a ﬁxed exchange rate leads to external
imbalances. As a consequence, a country experiencing a high rate of inﬂation might be
reluctant to ﬁx its exchange rate. Following this argument, we introduce the inﬂation rate
diﬀerential (INFL) into our speciﬁcation. We use as a benchmark inﬂation rate the German
inﬂation rate. We suppose that the German inﬂation rate is a good approximation of the
European one, since in the 90’s, European countries followed the monetary policy of the
Bundesbank.
According to Krugman’s currency crisis model, the collapse of pegged exchange rate is
accompanied by a steady erosion of international reserves. In fact, the attack on a currency
immediately depletes reserves and forces the authorities to abandon the parity. Thus, the
level of international reserves has often been used as a leading currency crisis indicator. A
country willing to peg has to hold a high amount of international reserves to improve the
credibility of its exchange rate arrangement. We examine the importance of the level of
international reserves (RESERVES as the ratio of international reserves to broad money) in
the selection of exchange rate regime.
While this traditional approach stresses the role played by declining international re-
serves in triggering the collapse of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, some recent models suggest
that the decision to abandon the parity or to choose a ﬂexible regime may stem from the au-
thorities concern about the evolution of other key economic variables. For instance, Ozkan
and Sutherland (1995) present a model in which the authorities’ objective function depends
positively on certain beneﬁts derived from keeping a ﬁxed nominal exchange rate and nega-
tively on the deviations of output from a certain level. Under a ﬁxed exchange rate, increases
in foreign interest rates lead to higher domestic interest rates and lower levels of output,
making it more costly for the authorities to maintain the parity. These hypotheses are
consistent with the European experience in 1992-1993, when speculative attacks coincided
with a deepening recession that worsened the high level of unemployment. More generally,
this approach suggests that a variety of factors, which may aﬀect the authorities’ objective
function, could be used as indicators of a currency crisis. For instance, an increase in the do-
mestic interest rate, needed to maintain a ﬁxed exchange rate, may result in higher ﬁnancing
costs for the government. To the extent that the authorities are concerned about the ﬁscal
consequences of their exchange rate policy, the decision to adopt a peg may depend on the
9public deﬁcit. It might be an important argument particularly in CEECs, since these coun-
tries wish to join EMU and, therefore, have to respect the convergence criteria.7 However,
t h el i n kb e t w e e nt h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ea n dt h ep u b l i cd e ﬁcit is not clear. A ﬂexible
exchange rate may reduce the risk of speculative attacks and of interest rates increases,
necessary to defend the peg. Nevertheless, as a ﬂexible regime increases the uncertainty, the
risk premium raises the interest rates and thus the level of the public deﬁcit. We investigate
the relevance of the public deﬁcit to the choice of the exchange rate regime by using as a
regressor the level of government’s deﬁcit as a percentage of GDP (DEFICIT). The values
of the three crises variables will be lagged one period.
3.4 Political economy
Numerous authors emphasized the credibility gains of adopting a peg arrangement.8 It
has been argued that governments with a low institutional credibility, willing to convince
the public of their commitment to price stability, may adopt a peg as a ”policy crutch” to
tame inﬂationary expectations. Accordingly, weak governments that are more vulnerable to
expansionary pressures may choose to use a peg as an instrument to eliminate (or consider-
ably reduce) these pressures. In addition, some authors argued that a ﬁxed exchange rate
disciplines the government because any ﬁscal excess might result in a currency crisis.9
Collins (1996) and Edwards (1996) built their empirical models around a framework in
which the political cost associated with a devaluation under ﬁxed exchange rates plays a
major role. While Collins did not directly use political economy variables in her analysis,
Edwards introduces variables that measure the degree of political stability and the strength
of the government. He ﬁnds that weaker governments and unstable political environments
reduce the likelihood that a peg will be adopted. His results reﬂect the ”sustainability
hypothesis”, contradicting ”policy crutch” approach.
In order to investigate which political economy approach is appropriate to the selection
of the exchange rate regime in CEECs, we follow Edwards (1996) and we employ two indices.
The strength of the government is measured as the fraction of seats in the lower chamber of
the parliament held by the government’s party or coalition (GOVERN). The second index
(POLSTAB) focuses on instances where there has been a transfer of power from a party or
group in oﬃce, to a party or group formally in the opposition. This index measures the
stability of the political system since its value increases with the number of years that the
party or a coalition is in oﬃce.10
7The public ﬁnance convergence criteria impose a constraint of 3 % on public deﬁcit and of 60% on
public debt, both in terms of GDP.
8See the precursors Barro and Gordon (1983), Giavazzi and Pagano (1998) and Drazen (2000).
9See Aghevli et al. (1991).
10The detailes on the construction of this measure are included in Appendix 1.
104 Baseline model of Regime Choice
In this section we present the econometric model which is applied to test the hypotheses
presented in the previous section, in a uniﬁed framework. We describe the choices of ex-
change rate regimes using a discrete variable, yi,t. Following our classiﬁcation from Section
2.2, this variable can take one of the four values:
yi,t =0 if a ﬂexible regime is chosen by the country i in year t,
yi,t =1 if the country i chooses the intermediate regime in year t,
yi,t =2 if a soft peg is chosen by country i in year t,
yi,t =3 if a currency board arrangement is adopted by country i in year t
with the probabilities pi, where i =0 ,1,2,3 and
3 X
i=0
pi =1 . This choice is based on the
continuous latent variable y∗
i,t (attractiveness of the ﬁxed exchange rate regime), which is a
linear function of all the economic variables discussed above:
y∗
i,t = Zi,t + ui,t, for i=1 ,2,...,N,t =1 ,2,...,T i,
where Zi,t is a vector of explanatory variables, N is the number of countries and Ti denotes
the number of observations for country i. The likelihood of belonging to these categories
is deﬁned in terms of probabilities of the values of an underlying latent variable y∗
i,t .W e
assume that the country chooses a ﬂexible exchange rate regime when the latent variable is
below a certain threshold level c1:
yi,t =0if y∗
i,t <c 1.
When the latent variable is between the two thresholds c1 and c2 the country adopts the
intermediate regime:
yi,t =1if c1 <y ∗
i,t <c 2.
If the latent variable takes values between c2 and c3 the country chooses the ”traditional
peg”:
yi,t =2if c2 <y ∗
i,t <c 3.
Finally, if the latent variable exceeds c3 the country adopts the currency board arrangement:
yi,t =3if y∗
i,t >c 3.
11These three thresholds (c1 <c 2 <c 3) are estimated in our analysis along with the coeﬃcients
of the explanatory variables of the vector Zi,t. The probabilities of yi,t being classiﬁed as
ﬂexible, intermediate, pegged or hard peg are given by:
Pr(yi,t =0 ) = P r( Zi,t + ui,t <c 1)
=P r ( ui,t <c 1 − Zi,t)=F (c1 − Zi,t),
Pr(yi,t =1 ) = P r( c1 <Z i,t + ui,t <c 2)
=P r ( c1 − Zi,t <u i,t <c 2 − Zi,t)=F(c2 − Zi,t) − F(c1 − Zi,t),
Pr(yi,t =2 ) = P r( c2 <Z i,t + ui,t <c 3)
=P r ( c2 − Zi,t <u i,t <c 3 − Zi,t)=F(c3 − Zi,t) − F(c2 − Zi,t),
Pr(yi,t =3 ) = P r( Zi,t + ui,t >c 3)
=P r ( ui,t >c 3 − Zi,t)=1− F (c3 − Zi,t),
where F(x)=P r ( ui,t <x ) is the cumulative probability distribution of the error term. We
can assume here that the error term follows the logistic or normal distribution. Because
the information criteria (Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn) do not indicate clearly the
superior model (probit or logit) for our data set, we assume the error term ui,t, to be i.i.d
with a logistic distribution function with a mean of 0 and variance of π2
3 . Because the
probit estimations provide the similar results, our arbitrary choice of logistic distribution
does not have any negative consequences on the quality of this study. Since the values of the
exchange rate regime variable can be logically ordered, this gives rise to an ordered logit.
Accordingly, the probabilities of yi,t taking values 0, 1 , 2 or 3 are given by:
12Pr(yi,t =0 ) = Λ(c1 − Zi,t)=
1
1+e x p( Zi,t − c1)
,
Pr(yi,t =1 ) = Λ(c2 − Zi,t) − Λ(c1 − Zi,t)=
1
1+e x p( Zi,t − c2)
−
1
1+e x p( Zi,t − c1)
,
Pr(yi,t =2 ) = Λ(c3 − Zi,t) − Λ(c2 − Zi,t)=
1
1+e x p( Zi,t − c3)
−
1
1+e x p( Zi,t − c2)
,
Pr(yi,t =3 ) = 1− Λ(c3 − Zi,t)=1−
1
1+e x p( Zi,t − c3)
,
where Λ(.) represents the logistic distribution function. The estimates of the coeﬃcients of
the vector Zi,t and the thresholds c1, c2 and c3 are obtained by maximizing the likelihood
function using the Quadratic Hill Climbing algorithm.
The econometric literature on panel data models suggests to employ the speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects model, if one focuses on a particular set of countries. This is clearly the case of our
study. However, the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is inconsistent in the case of a
country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects models. As N tends to inﬁnity, for a ﬁxed T, the number of
ﬁxed eﬀects µi, for i =1 ,...,N, increases with the sample size N, and we have an incidental-
parameter problem. This means that ﬁxed eﬀects cannot be consistently estimated for a
ﬁxed T. MLE is consistent when T tends to inﬁnity. However, T is usually small for panel
data (T=10 in our case). For the linear panel data regression model, when T is ﬁxed,
only parameters of explanatory variables β can be estimated consistently, by removing the
ﬁxed eﬀects from the estimated model by the Within transformation. This is possible for
the linear case because the MLE of β and µi are asymptotically independent, but this is no
longer the case for a qualitative limited dependent variable model with ﬁxed T (Chamberlain
1980). Therefore, we pool all country-year observations to run an ordered logit estimation.
We should test here for the poolability of our data, which means to compare the panel data
model to the cross-section model. The standard procedure in this case would be to use the
likelihood ratio test for two models: the large one with estimated speciﬁcc o u n t r ye ﬀects and
the nested one without these eﬀects. However, since the ML is an inconsistent estimator of
the ﬁrst one, the likelihood ratio test fails ex ante. Therefore, we will proceed to a pooled
data ordered logit estimation.
135 The econometric results and their implications
In this section we empirically assess the importance of the hypotheses of the four approaches
t ot h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ec h o i c ei nC E E C s . W ee s t i m a t et h es p e c i ﬁcation, for de jure
and de facto classiﬁcations.
5.1 De jure exchange rate regimes
The results of de jure classiﬁcation estimations are reported in Table 2. A positive sign
of a coeﬃcient means that an increase of the associated variable raises the probability of
adopting a hard peg. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we also report
the discrete changes in probabilities of choosing a hard peg (y=3), a soft peg (y=2), an
intermediate regime (y=1) and a ﬂoat (y=0), for signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. These changes are
the diﬀerences in the predicted probabilities as one explanatory variable changes by one
unit, and all the other regressors are held at their means.












LR χ2(9 df )a
Predictive powerb (%)
coeﬀ z-statistic changes in probabilities
y=3 y=2 y=1 y=0
0.036 3.08** 0.007 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001
-0.010 -1.24
-0.529 -2.18** -0.041 -0.065 0.040 0.066
-0.095 -4.64*** -0.009 -0.012 0.011 0.010
-0.186 -0.67
0.010 1.95* 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
0.009 1.15
-0.367 -3.43*** -0.030 -0.046 0.033 0.043




Notes:* z statistics signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
a: The χ2 value is deﬁned as 2(L1−L0),where the L0 is the value of the log-likelihood function
with only the constant term, and L1 is the value of the log-likelihood function when all the
explanatory variables are included.
b: Since for ordered logit models the R2 is meaningless, we report here an appropriate measure
of goodness of ﬁt, i.e. predictive power of the speciﬁcation. This measure computes the share
of regimes correctly predicted by the model.
First of all, we note that the model correctly predicts 71 percent of the de jure exchange
rate regimes in CEEC. The results suggest that six out of nine explanatory variables play
a role in choosing the exchange rate regime in CEECs. The size of the economy (GDP)
does not play the role in the selection of the de jure exchange rate regime. The coeﬃcient
of the degree of trade openness (OPENNESS) is signiﬁcant and has the expected sign.
14More open CEECs tend to adopt more rigid exchange rate regimes. A one percentage
point increase in the openness ratio increases the probability of choosing a currency board
by 0.007, holding all the other explanatory variables at their means. Figure 1 shows the
eﬀect of the trade openness on the probability of adopting a currency board. All the other
explanatory variables are held constant at their means.
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The ﬁgure presents the relationship between predicted probability of adopting
a currency board and the trade openness. The later is deﬁned here as a share
of the sum of imports and exports in terms of GDP. All the other explanatory
variables are held constant at their means.
Figure 1 shows that the relationship between the probability that a hard peg is chosen
and the degree of openness is not linear. However, we see clearly that the increase in degree
of trade openness increases the probability of choosing a hard peg.
Turning to the ”impossible trinity hypothesis”, coeﬃcients of two ﬁnancial variables are
signiﬁcant. The development of the ﬁnancial sector (MONEY) favors the choice of more
ﬂexible exchange rate systems. This is as expected. However, the countries that are more
integrated to capital markets (RESTR, decrease of restrictions) are more prone to adopt
a peg. According to the ”bipolar view”, ﬁnancially open countries should choose a hard
peg or a pure ﬂoat. The results show that as CEECs open their capital account they move
towards the rigid corner. Only one crises indicator seems to play a signiﬁcant role in the
choice of exchange rate regime. The larger the inﬂation diﬀerential (INFL) with Germany,
the larger the likelihood of adopting a ﬁx regime. For each additional percentage point of
inﬂation diﬀerential the probability of adopting a soft peg increases by 0.01, holding all
the other explanatory variables constant at their means. In fact, CEECs used the ﬁxed
exchange rate as an external anchor to bring down the inﬂation expectations. Finally,
15both coeﬃcients of political stability variables are signiﬁcant. However, their signs are
opposite. The ﬁrst one (POLSTAB) suggests that, the more politically unstable the country
is, the more likely it is to select the rigid regime. This result supports the ”policy crutch”
hypothesis. Controversially, stronger governments have a greater tendency toward selecting
a pegged system. This result is a puzzle, and we check for the correlation between these two
variables. Although the correlation is low (0.1566), we perform the likelihood ratio test. Its
value is 18.55, which indicates that these two variables are jointly signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
In addition, we run separate regressions with each of them. The results conﬁrm statistical
signiﬁc a n c ea n dt h es i g n so ft h e i rc o e ﬃcients. The opposite signs of coeﬃcients of political
variables remain a puzzle.
5.2 De facto exchange rate regimes
Table 4 reports the results of the speciﬁcation of the de facto exchange rate regime. First
of all, we note that there are few diﬀerences between the results of the de facto and the
de jure regime speciﬁcation. This is not surprising given the fact that the discrepancies of
the two classiﬁcations are not substantial.11 Since many de facto measures of exchange rate
regimes have been developed and they seem to diﬀer one from the other 12, in addition to the
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ regimes measures, we employ as well the de facto classiﬁcation created
by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenger (LYS). The results of the estimations carried out with LYS
exchange rate regimes are very similar. We report here only the results of the speciﬁcation
of the de facto Reinhart and Rogoﬀ measure. Eight out of nine variables are individually
signiﬁcant, at least at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level. The de jure speciﬁcation exhibits a
lower level of predictive accuracy (65 percent against 71 percent of the de facto exchange
rate arrangements) of all exchange rate regimes in CEECs.
A sc a nb es e e ni nT a b l e4 ,t h ec o e ﬃcients of both OCA indicators are signiﬁcant. Simi-
larly to the de jure speciﬁcation results, the sign of the coeﬃcient of openness ratio (OPEN-
NESS) conﬁrms the OCA hypothesis. In contrast with the de jure speciﬁcation, the size
of the economy (GDP) inﬂuences the choice of exchange rate regime. Smaller pegs favor
rigid exchange rate regimes. For each additional billion of US dollars of the country’s real
GDP, the probability of choosing the pure ﬂoat increases by 0.0001, holding all the other
explanatory variables constant at their means. Turning to ﬁnancial variables, both coeﬃ-
cients indicate the signiﬁcant impact of ﬁnancial globalization on the choice of the de facto
exchange rate regime. More ﬁnancially open countries are more likely to adopt the rigid
regimes. As in the case of the de jure regime, an increasing inﬂation diﬀerential increases
11See Section 2.2.
12Frankel (2003) shows that Calvo’s and Reinhart’s measure of de facto exchange rate regimes diﬀers
considerably from the LYS classiﬁcation.
16Table 3: Determinants of de facto exchange rate regimes
Variables coeﬀ z-statistic changes in probabilities
y=3 y=2 y=1 y=0
OPENNESS 0.066 6.69*** 0.009 -0.007 -0.002 -0.0001
GDP -0.015 -1.86* -0.0007 -0.002 0.002 0.0001
RESTR -0.643 -2.29** -0.024 -0.104 0.117 0.011
MONEY -0.080 -4.40*** -0.001 -0.010 0.013 0.001
DEFICIT -0.287 -1.12
RESERVES 0.024 2.26** 0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.0001
INFL 0.007 3.52*** 0.0003 0.0008 -0.001 -0.0008
POLSTAB -0.188 -1.71* -0.009 -0.025 0.031 0.002
GOVERN 0.108 3.18** 0.005 0.013 -0.017 -0.001
Log likelihood -66.74
LR χ2(9)a 108.99
Predictive powerb (%) 65 %
Notes:* z statistics signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
a: The χ2 value is deﬁned as 2(L1 − L0),where the L0 is the value of the
log-likelihood function with only the constant term, and L1is the value of the
log-likelihood function when all the explanatory variables are included.
b: Since for ordered logit models the R2 is meaningless, we report here an
appropriate measure of goodness of ﬁt, i.e. predictive power of the speciﬁcation.
This measure computes the share of regimes correctly predicted by the model.
the probability of adopting a peg. A one percentage point increase in this diﬀerential in-
creases the probability of adopting a soft peg by 0.0008, all the other regressors being held
constant at their means. Finally, the choice of the de facto exchange rate regimes in CEECs
depends signiﬁcantly on the political conditions of the country. On the one hand, stronger
governments favor pegs. On the other hand, politically unstable countries are more likely
to adopt the rigid regime. The speciﬁcation of the de facto regimes conﬁrms the political
conditions puzzle in CEECs. Finally, in contrast with the de jure regimes, the de facto ones
are determined by the level of available international reserves. An additional percentage
point in the ratio of international reserves increases the probability of adopting a soft peg
by 0.001, holding all the other explanatory variables constant at their means.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The objective of this study was to identify the sources of divergences between exchange rate
strategies among CEECs. We investigated two potential reasons for these divergences. First,
we built an extended speciﬁcation of the exchange rate regime choice. We considered the
relevance of variables suggested by traditional and modern theories. Second, we employed
two distinct classiﬁcations of exchange rate regimes, i.e. de jure and de facto.I no r d e rt o
test the validity of our hypotheses we used an ordered logit framework.
The estimations of both the de jure and the de facto speciﬁcations provide very similar
17results. This shows that the de facto exchange rate regimes in CEECs do not diverge
considerably from what is announced. Thus, the diﬀerence of the exchange rate strategies
among CEECs cannot be explained by the inappropriateness of the diﬀerent classiﬁcations.
Moreover, the convergence between the de facto and the de jure exchange rate regimes over
time indicates the important gains in credibility of monetary authorities.
The results lend overall support to the following traditional and modern determinants
o ft h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e .C o n ﬁr m i n gt h eO C At h e o r y ,ﬁxing is strongly associated with
small and open economies. Strong governments are more capable to implement more rigid
exchange rate regimes. A country experiencing a high inﬂation rate diﬀerential adopts a peg
as an instrument of disinﬂation policy: it strongly favours the idea of using the exchange
rate regime as an instrument of importing credibility. Finally, two ﬁnancial variables play
as i g n i ﬁcant role in the choice of the exchange rate regime in these countries. First, the
development of the ﬁnancial sector favours ﬂoats in CEECs. Second, ﬁnancial openness
favours pegs. Since the ”impossible trinity” approach rules out a combination of interme-
diate exchange rates and open capital markets, more ﬁnancially integrated countries switch
to more rigid regimes (and ultimately hard pegs).
Financial and trade openness seem to be the major determinants of divergences among
exchange rate strategies in CEECs. Bulgaria, Lithuania and Estonia, which exhibit very high
levels of ﬁnancial and trade openness, adopted currency boards arrangements. Countries
like Poland or Romania, which preserve certain restrictions on their capital accounts and
are less open to international trade, still use more ﬂexible exchange rate regimes. This result
suggests that complete ﬁnancial and trade liberalisation vis-à-vis the EU, required from all
the new members, will tend to move all CEECs towards a rigid exchange rate regime.13
13Romania’s aim to gain EU membership in 2007 is strongly supported by the member states. Once this
country becomes an eﬀective member of the EU, it will also have to satisfy the acquis communautaire.
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21Appendix A
Frequencies of exchange rate regimes
Table 4: De jure dependent variable
Regime Value Count
Pure ﬂoat 0 24
Intermediate 1 23
Soft peg 2 28
Hard peg 3 25
100
The ﬁrst column includes the values of dependent variable. The second column
reports a count and a percentage (since the number of all the regimes is equal
to 100) of the corresponding exchange rate regimes.
Table 5: De facto dependent variable
Regime Value Count
Pure ﬂoat 0 23
Intermediate 1 27
Soft peg 2 26
Hard peg 3 24
100
The ﬁrst column includes the values of dependent variable. The second column
reports a count and a percentage (since the number of all the regimes is equal
to 100) of the corresponding exchange rate regimes.
22Appendix B
Data Description
Table 6: Data description
Variable Deﬁnition and Source
DEBT Lagged value of the stock of public debt in terms of GDP.
(Source: EBRD Transition Report).
DE JURE Oﬃcial exchange rate regimes. (Source: IMF
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions).
DE FACTO Actual exchange rate regimes. (Source: Reinhart C. Rogoﬀ K., 2002)
GDP Real GDP in billions of US dollars.(Source: IFS, various issues).
GOVERN Strength of Government measured as the fraction
of seats in the lower chamber of the parliament on the number
of seats held by the governmental party or coalition. (Source: Database of
Political Institutions 2000, Thorsen et al. and calculations of the authors).
INFL Inﬂation diﬀerential (π − π∗) where π is a domestic inﬂation rate
and π∗ is a German inﬂation rate. (Source: IFS).
MONEY Financial development measured as a ratio of broad money to GDP.
(Source: EBRD Transition Report).
OPENNESS Degree of trade openness measured as the ratio of exports
and imports to the GDP. (Source: IFS).
POLSTAB Political stability: the value of the index increases with the number of
years that the government stays in oﬃce (value of one for every year).
If there is a transfer of power from a party or group in oﬃce, to a party
or group formally in the opposition, the value falls to one again.
(Source: www.electionworld.org, calculations of the authors).
RESERVES International reserves measured as the ratio of international reserves
(without gold) to broad money. (Source: EBRD Transition Report).
RESTR Restrictions on capital movements. The values of the index are included
between 0 and 6, where 0 indicates no restrictions and 6 stands for completely
closed capital account. (Source: The index created and provided by
Garibaldi P., Mora N.,Sahay R., Zettelmeyer J. (IMF), updated by the authors)14.
.
14We are very grateful to J. Zettelmeyer who provided us with this dataset.
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